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Divya Anne Jeswant' and Par

Kumar,

In this case note, the authors examine the scope and extent of the
power to grant an interim injunction conferred on Indian courts
under section 9 of the Arbitration and ConciliationAct, 1996. The
notefirst looks at the historicalposition regardinggrantof an interim
injunction in arbitration disputes including the changes brought
about by section 9 of the 1996 legislation. It then looks at the
interpretationgiven to section 9 and principles laid down by the
Hon' ble Supreme Courtfor granting interim injunction in this case.
It also gives suggestionsfor further reforms.
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LEGISLATIVE BACKDROP

Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter 'the
1996 Act') provides for the granting of interim relief "before, during or after arbitral
proceedings, or at any time after the making of the arbitral award, but before it is
Il Year, B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
III Year, BA. LL.B. (Hons.), National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
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enforced". Sub-section (ii) enumerates some of the specific forms of interim relief
that can be granted to parties who have entered into a contract containing an
arbitration clause. Section 9(ii)(d) deals with the granting of an interim injunction
by the court.
Section 9 finds its origins in Article 26' of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
1976,2 but it differs from this provision insofar as the latter is restricted in its
elaboration of specific grounds under which interim relief can be claimed; whereas
the former provides for a number of specific types of interim relief that the court
may grant. The wide amplitude of section 9, as contemplated by the Legislature,
can be gauged from the inclusion of a "just and convenient" interim measure in
the section, which would solely depend on the discretion of the court.
While the 1996 Act is entirely founded on the UNCITRAL Model Law, 19853
(hereinafter 'Model Law'), section 9 marks a significant departure from the
analogous provision in the Model Law, Article 9,4 which merely establishes that
any interim measure of protection granted by the court would not be incompatible
with the arbitration agreement. This Article merely acknowledges the possibility
that, if a party goes to the court seeking an interim measure, such an action might
be construed as being tantamount to a waiver of the right to take recourse to
arbitration by that party. Therefore, Article 9 clarifies that, even if a party
approaches the court to seek interim relief, this does not preclude him from
subsequently initiating arbitration proceedings.5
Article 26, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 1976 reads:
"Interim Measures of Protection:
1. At the request of either party, the arbitral tribunal may take any interim measures
it deems necessary in respect of the subject-matter of the dispute, including measures
for the conservation of the goods forming the subject matter in dispute, such as

ordering their deposit with a third person of the sale of perishable goods.
2.

Such interim measures may be established in the form of an interim award. The

arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to require security for the costs of such measures.
3. A request for interim measures addressed by any party to a judicial authority
shall not be deemed incompatible with the agreement to arbitrate, or as a waiver of
that agreement."
O. P. MALHOTRA, THE

3

LAw AND

PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION 379 (20o6).

Preamble, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Article 9, UNCITRAL Model Law, 1985 reads:
"Arbitration Agreement and Interim Measures by Court - It is not
incompatible with an arbitration agreement for a party to request, before or during

s

arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim measure of protection and for a court
to grant such measure."
A. REDFERN ETAL., LW AND PRACIEc
or TERNAnOMAL COMMERc!ALARITRATION 336 (2006). See
also R. S. BAcHAWAT, LAW oF ARBiTRATION AND CONCILIATION VOL. 1337(2005).
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The basic objective underlying section 9 of the 1996 Act, as can be gauged
from the corresponding provision in the Model Law, is to provide for urgently
required interim relief where no arbitral tribunal has been constituted and any
delay in the grant of interim relief would prejudice the party.! At this juncture, it
is important to distinguish section 9 from section 17, with the latter dealing with
the grant of interim relief by an arbitral tribunal. Section 17 is clearly of no utility
in such a situation as it cannot provide the party with the necessary relief sought.
It is submitted that section 9 constitutes a rare and justified exception to
section 5 of the 1996 Act which mandates minimal judicial intervention in
arbitration proceedings. The power of the court is not derogatory but
complementary to the power of the arbitral tribunal to grant interim relief. Far
from being antithetical to the objects of the 1996 Act, the provision, in fact,
facilitates more effective interim relief.
The previous legislation consolidating the law on arbitration in India, the
Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter 'the 1940 Act'), laid down, under section 18,
that the interim relief could not be granted prior to the filing of the arbitration
award. There was no question of any interim measure prior to or during the
pendency of arbitration proceedings under section 18. However, under section
41(b) read with paragraph 2 of the Second Schedule of the 1940 Act, interim relief

could be applied for during the pendency of arbitral proceedings. The Supreme
Court has categorically held that, under this provision, the commencement of
arbitration proceedings was a condition precedent to the granting of interim
relief'

It is of note that while section 9 is modelled on section 41(b) read with
paragraph 2 of the Second Schedule of the 1940 Act, it is in stark contrast with the
same, since there is no longer any requirement of the arbitration proceedings
having begun, in order to claim interim relief. Clearly, the Legislature intended to
liberalize the scope of section 9 of the 1996 Act. The new section was interpreted
Further, Domke notes that American courts have arrived at a consensus that the
power of the court to grant interim relief is not inconsistent with the foundational
basis of arbitration law as contained in the Federal Arbitration Act. See Domke on
6

CommercialArbitration 135:2.
R. BERNSTEIN ET. AL., HANDBOOK OF ARBITRATION PRAcTicE 668 (1998). See D.A. Redfern,

Arbitrationand the Courts:Interim Measures ofProtection- Is the TideAbout to Turn?,
30 TEx. INTL
7

L.J. 71.

Sant Ram and Co. v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 147. See also Sundaram
Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd., (1999) 2 S.C.C. 479.
It must be noted that there existed a divergence of opinion regarding the issue of

whether commencement of arbitral proceedings was a precondition to the granting
of interim relief. See P.M. BAKsuI, PARucK's ARBTRATION Acr 581 (1991).
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in the landmark decision of Sundaram FinanceLtd. v. NEPC IndiaLtd. where the
Supreme Court held that the wording of section 9 and its rationale lead to the
conclusion that interim relief may be granted even prior to the initiation of
arbitration proceedings. However, the Court attempted to put in place a check to
ensure that a party does not successfully obtain interim relief and then deliberately
omit to commence arbitration. It was mandated that the court ensure that the
claimant party demonstrate a "manifest intention" to commence arbitration. It
was also suggested that, in all such cases, the court grant a conditional order
making the interim relief contingent on the arbitration beginning within a
reasonable time. The extension of the power of the court to grant equitable relief
under the 1996 Act will be highlighted by this comment, in the context of this
decision.

1I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The appellant, a company engaging in the business of, inter alia, model and
celebrity endorsement, sports management and marketing, entered into a
Promotion Agreement in the nature of a contract with respondent No. 1, Zaheer
Rhan, a successful Indian cricketer, on i.11.2ooo. As per a condition laid down in
clause 31(b) of the contract, respondent No. i was required to give an opportunity
to the appellant to match any offer made to him by a third party. This was to be
done before respondent No. 1 could enter into an agreement with that third party.
In the event that the appellant's offer did not match that of the third party,
respondent No. i would be at liberty to enter into a contract with the third party.
The contract also contained an arbitration clause as per which disputes relating
to the agreement could be referred to arbitration.
The appellant sent a letter to respondent No.1 on 29.07.2003 containing
the draft terms of the proposed extension of the Promotion Agreement. On
10.09.2003, respondent No. i replied to the same stating that he did not wish to

renew or extend the Promotion Agreement and further stating that he did not
wish to appoint any agent for the purpose of managing his media affairs. On
28.10.2003, one day before the expiry of the initial term of the Promotion
Agreement, respondent No. i replied to another letter sent to him by the appellant,
dated 27.10.2003, arguing that clause 31(b) of the contract was void under section

of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 for restraint of trade. Subsequently, after the
expiry of the Promotion Agreement, respondent No. i entered into a contract
with respondent No. 2, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956,
thereby replacing the appellant as the manager of his media affairs.
27

8 Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd., (1999)
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On o4.12.200, the appellant filed an Arbitration Petition before a single
judge of the Bombay High Court under section 9 of the 1996 Act, praying, inter
alia, for an interim order to restrain respondent No. i from entering into any
agreement or continuing to act upon any agreement that he had entered into with
the respondent No. 2, or any third party, without performing his obligations under
clause 31(b) of the Promotion Agreement between the appellant and respondent
No. i. The Single Judge granted an injunction for the period pending the
commencement and completion of the arbitration proceedings. Subsequently,
both respondents appealed separately to a Division Bench of the Bombay High
Court. On 19.12.2003, the Division Bench passed an order holding clause 31(b) of
the contract between the appellant and the Respondent No. i to be void under
section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. It allowed both the appeals and
dismissed the arbitration petition. The appellant then filed two Special Leave
Petitions before the Supreme Court. The apex court upheld the decision of the
Division Bench on the nullity of clause 31(b) on the ground that it was in restraint
of trade under section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 insofar as it operated
after the expiry of the Promotion Agreement. On the issue of interim relief under
section 9 of the 1996 Act, it was held that granting the injunction sought would be
in contravention of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and contrary to the balance of
convenience which was favour of respondent No. i.

III.

LEGAL IssuEs

In this judgment, five broad issues came up for consideration before the
Supreme Court. First, the Court considered the merits of the contention of
Respondent No. i that the granting of an injunction to the appellant in this case
would be violative of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Further, since the balance of
convenience in this case was in favour of respondent No. i, granting of injunction
would be inequitable. Second, it examined whether interim relief could be granted
in an arbitration petition, wherein there has been inordinate delay in initiating
the arbitration proceedings on the part of the party seeking the interim relief.
Third, it was sought to be determined whether interim relief could be granted

against a third party, who is not party to the arbitration agreement. Fourth, the
issue of whether an arbitration petition under section 9 of the 1996 Act would be
maintainable against respondent No. 2, who is not party to the arbitration
agreement, was raised and finally, the Court dealt with the issue of whether clause
31(b) of the contract between the appellant and respondent No. 1 was in restraint
of trade within the meaning contemplated by section 27 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872.'
9 On the issue of restraint of trade, the Court upheld the decision of the Division Bench
of the BombayHigh Court stating that clause 31(b) of the Promotion Agreement
81
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A. Delay in Commencing Arbitration

The facts of the case reveal that the appellant filed an arbitration petition
on 04.12.2003 seeking interim relief under section 9 of the 1996 Act for the
arbitration to be initiated against respondent No. 1. However, even in 2o06, it

had made no attempt to commence arbitration proceedings. The Court rejected
the argument of the appellant that it had acted expeditiously in filing an arbitration
petition as soon as it learned of the contract between Respondents No. i and 2 and
had then been following up on the matter through the continued proceedings
before the Division Bench and this case in the Supreme Court. The Court also
noted that since no injunction had been granted, the contract between the
Respondents No. i and 2 had continued to subsist and would soon be completed.
To grant an injunction two years into its operation would be inequitable, especially
when the appellant could simply be compensated monetarily.
It is evident from the facts that, as alleged by the respondents, the appellant
attempted to misuse section 9 of the 1996 Act by obtaining interim relief for an
arbitration that they had no intention of commencing. The Supreme Court has
held in Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd.10 that, when a court grants
interim relief before arbitration has commenced, it may do so only when there is
manifest intention on the part of the applicant to refer the matter to arbitration. A
court may also grant a conditional order for interim relief with terms ensuring
that the applicant commences arbitration proceedings within a reasonable period
of time. This will effectively prevent a party from obtaining the ultimate relief to
be sought in arbitration in the guise of interim relief without ever initiating
arbitration. The instant case exemplifies such undesirable abuse of section 9.
However, it must be noted that, while the Court did acknowledge that there had
been inordinate delay in commencing arbitration, this factor was used solely for
the purpose of examining the issue of the balance of convenience, hence,
completely ignoring its implications for section 9.
It is submitted that the Court disregarded leading precedent on the point
by first, failing to acknowledge the ratio in Sundaram FinanceLtd. which requires
a finding that there be manifest intention of the parties to commence arbitration
before interim relief can be granted and, second, by sidelining the issue of delay in
commencing arbitration, thereby diluting its importance.

was violative of § 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 insofar as it continued to
operate after the expiry of the Promotion Agreement. After a consideration of the
leading cases on this point, it was concluded that the restrictive covenant would
apply during the subsistence of the Promotion Agreement but would attract § 27
and be rendered void after the Promotion Agreement has come to an end.
'0

Supra note 8.
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The Court ought to have first ensured that the parties did possess the
requisite intention to initiate arbitration before delving into issues that, in light of
the patent delay on the part of the appellant, are, at best, incidental. Legally, the
issues on the merits ought not to have been discussed at all. The judgment is
clearly flawed as it is characterised by a misplaced sense of the relative priority to
be assigned to the two primary issues of delay and the permissibility of an interim
injunction.
B. Basis for an Interim Injunction
Before granting an injunction under section 9 (ii), the Court must look into
whether the specific form of relief sought is permissible. This is an enquiry wholly
independent of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In the instant case,
the Court looked into the legality of the injunction under sections 14 and 41(e) of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963." Additionally, the Court noted that precedent on the
point had consistently refused to specifically enforce a contract for personal
services12 where the relationship between the parties was one of trust and
confidence. The injunction would have the unjust effect of compelling respondent
No. 1 to enter into a management contract with the appellant thereby specifically
enforcing clause 32(g) of the Promotion Agreement. Furthermore, the appellant
was practically claiming the whole relief that could be claimed at arbitration and
the interim nature of the injunction was, therefore, rendered illusory. This
amounted to pre-empting the decision of the arbitral tribunal.
The crux of the decision of the apex court appears to be based on the balance
of convenience test. 3 It was held that while the appellants could be compensated
monetarily, respondent No. i would be irreparably injured by being forced into a
personal services contract with the appellant despite the fact that he no longer
reposed any trust or confidence in him. Given that the discretionary remedy
under section 9 aims at bringing about an equitable result, the decision of the
Supreme Court on this issue appears sound.
n In the instant case, the Court looked into the legality of the injunction sought in
terms of § 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Court accepted the contention of
Respondent No. i who argued that granting the injunction would amount to the
enforcement of a negative covenant under § 14.
Pollock and Mulla note that even if a contract is not a contract of service, the equitable
principle relating to personal service applies to contracts involving personal service.
See POILOCK AND MULLA, INDIAN CowNRAr Acr AND SPECIFIC RELIEF Acts VOL. II 2531 (2006).
'3

Kerr expounds upon the circumstances in which the balance of convenience test: "a
man who seeks the aid of the Court must be able to show a good primafacie legal title
to the right which he asserts. If the right at law under the covenant is clear or fairly
made out, and the breach of it is clear or fairly made out, and serious injury is likely
to arise from the breach, it is the duty of the Court to interfere before the hearing to
restrain the breach. But if the right at law under the covenant is not clear or is not
83
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C. Interim Relief Against a Third Party
Although the Court noted the submissions of both counsels on the third
issue mentioned above, it is not subsequently addressed in the course of rendering
the decision. In regard to this issue, reference may be made to the treatises of
RuSSELL1 and REDFERN'S which recognise the inevitability of sometimes having to
grant interim relief as against a third party. It is submitted that a difference must
be made between granting interim relief against a third party, on the one hand,
and granting relief to a party to the arbitration agreement which would affect the
rights of a third party, on the other. This must be qualified by stating that, while it
is permissible to grant such relief where the third party is affected incidentally as
a result of the relief being granted to the claimant, this cannot be extended to
those cases in which the rights of the third parties are affected in a manner so
drastic that the result is clearly inequitable. A third party could be gravely
prejudiced by the loss of his rights. At the same time, the refusal to grant interim
relief to the claimant may render the ultimate relief sought nugatory and the
arbitration proceedings infructuous.'6 Hence, section 9 should be construed in a
manner such that a delicate balance is struck between the rights of the claimant
and the rights of the affected third party by assessing the relative prejudice that
would be caused to each.
D. Maintainability of an ArbitrationPet tion Against a Third Party
As regards the fourth issue it was argued that the cause of action in the
arbitration petition, which was constituted by the contyact between respondent
No.1 and respondent No.2 (with the latter being a third party who was outside the
scope of the arbitration agreement) could not fall within the arbitration clause
and section 9 could not be invoked. This issue, too, is left unaddressed by the
Court. It is submitted that this dispute clearly relates to an alleged breach of the
fairly made out, or the breach of it is doubtful and no serious injury can arise to the
plaintiff, pending the trial of the right, the case resolves itself into a question of
comparative injury, whether the defedenant will be more damnified by the
injunction being granted or the plaintiff by its being withheld". J. M. PATERsoN, KERR
oN INsuNCrIONs

410-411 (1999). In the instant case, the appellant's right at law is not

clearly or fairly made out, since there is serious doubt as to whether clause 31(b) of
the Promotion Agreement can provide such a right in law, in light of § 27 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872. See also LORD HAitsHAM or ST. MARYLEBONE, HALSHURY'S LAws OF
476-477 (1999).
Russell notes that interim relief against a third party will have to be sought from the
Court and not the arbitral tribunal since the latter cannot exercise jurisdiction over
a third party. See RUSSELL, ARBITRAtION i86 (2003).
Redfern and Hunter note that one of the situations in which the court will have to be
approached for interim relief is where a third party is involved. See A. REDFERN ET AL.,
ENGLAND VOL. 24
14

'5

LAw AND PRACHCE OF INTERNATONALCOMMERCIALARrITATION 336(2006).
6 M.J. MusuLL AND S.C. BoY, COMMERCIAL AxarraTION 329 (1989).
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contract subsisting between the appellant and Respondent No. 1 and is covered
by the arbitration clause 32(g) which extends to any claims relating to the
agreement.17 The mere existence of a third party cannot hinder the initiation of
arbitration proceedings for the alleged breach.

IV. CONCLUSION
This comment began by observing that section 9 of the 1996 Act represents
the broadening of the scope of interim relief vis-d-vis the 194o Act. A party may
now seek interim relief even prior to the commencement of arbitration
proceedings. However, since such a liberalisation increases the potential of abuse
of the provision, it is imperative that courts exercise tremendous caution in the
interpretation of section 9, so as to check the possibility of misuse.
In the instant case, much as the decision on balance of convenience was
sound, the first point of enquiry ought to have been whether there was an intention
on the part of the appellant to commence arbitration within a reasonable period
of time. Taking into account the facts of this case, the enquiry should have ceased
at that point and the appellant's prayer for interim relief rejected. The Court put
the cart before the horse by primarily addressing the question of whether an
interim injunction for a contract of personal service could be granted for an
arbitration that would never commence.
At the same time, a mere enquiry into the intention of a party to commence
arbitration does not provide an effective weapon to guard against abuse. The
intention of a party, especially at such an early stage, will be extremely difficult to
gauge accurately and will involve a high level of subjectivity. It is submitted that
the optimal solution is the inclusion of a proviso to section 9 of the 1996 Act
mandating a conditional order whenever interim relief is granted before the
commencement of arbitration proceedings. The terms of the order will stipulate
a reasonable time within which arbitration must be initiated.
The Law Commission of India in its

1 7 6 th

Report, 2001, recommended

certain procedural changes in section 9 which would remove the impediment
17

Clause 32(g) of the Promotion Agreement read:
"ARBITRATION - Any claims or controversies relating to this Agreement shall be
resolved by arbitration held under the auspices and rules of the Indian Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 by one arbitrator appointed in accordance with the

arbitration rules. The place of arbitration shall be Mumbai. Any award of such
arbitration shall be final, conclusive and legally binding, without any right of appeal
and may be entered into judgment in any court of competent jurisdiction. This
Agreement and all matters related hereto shall be governed by the laws of India."
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highlighted above. It was suggested that appointment of arbitrators under section
ii within a period of thirty days of the order granting interim relief be a condition
precedent to the continued validity of the interim measure so granted. In case of
default in commencing arbitration proceedings, the order for interim relief would
stand vacated.8

These provisions were not, however, subsequently incorporated into the
Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2001, as they ought to have been.
In conclusion, although, in the instant case, the Supreme Court missed an
excellent opportunity to enunciate the law on granting interim relief prior to the
commencement of arbitration, the decision serves as a useful pointer to the need
for the legislative reform indicated above.

The following sub-sections were proposed to be inserted in § 9:
"(4) Where a party makes an application under sub-section (1) for the grant of
interim measures before the commencement of arbitration, the court shall direct
the party in whose favour the interim measure is granted, to take effective steps for
the appointment of the arbitral tribunal in accordance with the procedure specified
in section ni, within a period of thirty days from the date of the said order.
(5) The court may direct that if such steps are not taken within the period of thirty
days specified under sub-section (4), the interim measure granted under sub-sections
(2) and (3), shall stand vacated on the expiry of the said period:
Provided that the court may on sufficient cause being shown for the delay in taking
such steps, extend the said period.
(6) Where an order granting an interim measure stands vacated under sub-section
(5), the court may pass such further orders as to restitution as it may deem fit

against the party in whose favour the interim measure is granted under this section."
86

